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Abstract 
This study examines the behaviour of key bank level stability factors of 
liquidity, capital, risk-taking and consumer confidence in Islamic and 
conventional banks which operate in the same market. Using fixed effect 
sample of 194 banks of Gulf Cooperating Countries between 2000 and 2007, 
we found that liquidity is not determined by bank’s product mix but rather 
attributed to systematic factors. However, non performing assets (representing 
loans to sub prime borrowers) have positive and significant relationship with 
liquidity implying that during the crisis, Islamic banks tend to take stringent risk 
strategies compared to conventional banks. Furthermore, Islamic banks 
generally tend to provide higher consumer confidence levels as they were 
more capitalized than conventional banks, although conventional banks had 
carried higher averages of liquidity compared to Islamic banks. Consumer 
confidence levels or depositors’ discipline as proxied by deposits and 
customer funding over liabilities generally appear to be higher in Islamic banks 
than conventional banks. 
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Bank level stability factors and consumer confidence – a 
comparative study of Islamic and conventional banks’ product 
mix 
 
1 Introduction 
There are numerous inferences that the product mix of Islamic banks’ provide 
more stability (Čihák and Hesse, 2008; Haque  et.al 2009; Aziz, 2009, Kia and 
Darrat 2003, Kaleem, 2000) and not affected by crisis because the nature of 
Islamic banks product mix does, for example does not trade in collateralized 
debt obligation market blamed for igniting the current bank crisis (Borio, 2008) 
particularly among European and American banks during the recent crisis.  
 
Bank stability in many studies is normally reflected by features of bank-
instability such as bank runs or illiquidity and subsequent risks relating to 
illiquidity in the banking sector in banks and henceforth in their customers. This 
lack of stability featured in our study coincide with the financial instability 
situation or crisis which climaxed in the summer of 2007 and affected the 
stability of not only banks but also other the whole spectrum of institutions that 
provide the financial services particularly in the US and Europe and 
responsible for a contagion to other world regions.  
 
This study examines the behavior of key bank level stability factors (of liquidity, 
capital, risk taking) and consumer confidence in Islamic and conventional 
banks which operate in the same market.  Examining the relationships and 
behavior of these four factors is considered contemporary in order to 
understand stability of the banking institutions and the financial system in 
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general. The stability of banking sector is the foundation of steadiness of the 
entire financial systems since banks play a central role in the money creation 
process; in the payment system, bank credit is an important factor in the 
financing of investment and growth. Furthermore to preserve monetary and 
financial stability central banks and supervisory authorities have a special 
interest in assessing banking system stability 
 
Previous studies have shown that majority of bank stability has been affected 
by liquidity problems (see, for example, Largan, 2000).  Bank liquidity itself is 
affected by many factors but credit risk and capital adequacy are closely 
intervening causes. It is for this reason that even regulators are very 
concerned about liquidity management, credit risk and consumer confidence 
by the banking institutions.  
 
We endeavor to compare product mixes of Islamic and conventional banking 
because of the assertion that Islamic banks during the crisis had provided 
more stability and that liquidity in such banks was much higher. Generally, 
liquidity management provide a distinctive characteristic compared to that of 
the conventional counterpart since the available product mix (financial 
instruments), normally used for liquidity management in conventional banking 
are interest-based and for that reason are prohibited and the applications are 
restricted in Islamic interbank money market. Similarly, the distinctive 
characteristics of respective product mix provide different practices and results 
on different behavior and levels risk capital and credit risk which have to 
comply with Basel Accord requirements 
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Nevertheless, literature on the issue of liquidity management, risk, capital and 
of confidence level of consumers of the Islamic banks product mix is invariably 
limited to issues related to efficiency (for instance, Yudistira, 2004; and Moktar, 
Abdullah, and Al- Habshi, 2006). To our knowledge, no previous research on 
the relationship between bank level stability factors and consumer confidence 
as stability factors been done and this study therefore considerate the 
literature on stability factors  
Finally, surveys in the US suggest that customer’s loose confidence in their 
financial system during the recent bank instability. For example the Gallup poll, 
(Figure 1) traces levels of confidence in banking since 1980 to 2005 which 
shows a declining consumer confidence the US banking sector from 60% to 
32% 
Figure 1 Consumer Confidence in the USA 
 
  
Unfortunately such surveys used in the US are normally based on consumer 
perceptions rather than the consequent behaviour. Therefore; in this paper we 
follow an econometric approach to examine the relationship between 
consumer confidence levels using bank level data to reflect actual behaviour 
rather than perceived behaviour. We compare if such behaviour impacts 
differently between Islamic bank product mix and conventional product mix.  
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In this paper we examines the behaviour of Islamic product mix particularly the 
relationship between stability factors of liquidity, risk and capital in Islamic and 
conventional commercial banks; We also examine stability factors of 
performance (ROAV –volatility) and firm value (Tobin Q) both in the Islamic 
and conventional commercial banks. Also we examine the level of non 
performing assets (NPA) as a result of poor loan screening lending to sub 
prime borrowers (reflected in loan-loss provisioning) and finally we examine if  
consumers confidence in the two market domain through sensitivity to deposit 
and customer funding over total liabilities  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly examine 
differentiating features between the Islamic and conventional banking 
practices. Section 3 discusses the methodology used in the study including 
construction of the variables, data issues and descriptive statistics used, while 
section 4 presents the empirical results. Summary, conclusions, and 
suggestions for further research are presented in section 4. . 
 
2 Main features of  product mix features  - a comparison 
In this section we examine the main features that contrast between the two 
specialization of banks, their similarities and issues pertinent issues regarding 
to capital adequacy, liquidity, risks and consumer perception on confidence 
levels.  
2.1 The main contrasts of the dual product mix. 
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The main contrasting feature between Islamic and conventional banks is 
based in interest payment in their transactions, and the prohibition of 
undertaking or financing unethical activities such as gambling, prostitution, 
alcohol and narcotics. Islamic banks are governed by Sharia, as well as the 
regulations set in place by individual host country1.. Basically, the Islamic bank 
has different objectives, procedure and operational characteristics in contrast 
to conventional banking which may also have different impact towards capital, 
liquidity, risk and may influence consumer behaviour towards confidence.  
 
There at least six basic ethical principles from the Quran: Avoidance of 
interest, risk sharing, treating of money as potential capital, prohibition of 
speculation, sanctity of contracts, and avoidance of prohibited activities such 
as those connected with alcohol and gambling. Table 1 summarizes key 
features that differentiate the nature of two product mixes. 
 
Table 1: Differentiating features in bank of Product mix 
 
Islamic bank product mix Conventional Product mix 
The product mix, each product or service is 
guided by sources of Shariah and products are 
approved by Sharia Board within each bank. 
Products are developed based on 
demand, competition and banks 
strategy. Products development is not 
guided 
religious doctrines and values but 
corporate governance practices and 
approved by the board of directors. 
The product mix aim intends to balance  
profit-maximisation doctrine and social 
responsibility 
The product mix focus that emphasise 
on profit and value creation 
Financing products/ instruments are based on 
either asset-backed trading contract or equity 
financing with risk sharing 
Financing instruments are based on 
interest bearing mechanism and 
market speculation 
Deposits products are compensated by profit 
loss sharing mechanism. 
Deposits are agreed rents  
Defaulters are not penalized (although in some Past due loan products are normally 
                                                 
1 Sharia product mix is based on the Islamic holy book – the Quran prohibits (riba) interest and 
threatens believers not to indulge in any transactions that are related to such interest. There are 
verses in the Quran (for example in Surat -Imran and Baqara) that give such prohibition. However, 
Sharia is also reinforced by Sunnah which is the tradition of the of the prophet.. 
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countries a small penalty is levied as a 
deterrent and channelled to charity. 
charged cumulative interest rate. 
Islamic banks product cannot finance economic 
activities which are non Sharia compliant 
(examples: loans to breweries, piggeries , 
casinos,  
There are no such restrictions for 
conventional 
banks 
Adapted from Dusk (2008) 
 
Conventional banks evolved over several centauries while only over the last 
thirty years, Islamic banks were purposely established to operate within the 
Sharia code of conduct (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005), while some banks were 
converted from conventional banks to Islamic ones. For example, in Iran and 
Sudan, all conventional banks were made to Islamic banks following a change 
in political regime that enacted legislation to change them (Sundararajan and 
Errico 2002). In other countries which are characterized with large Muslim 
populations like Malaysia, Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt allowed 
a parallel existence of Islamic banking along side conventional banks (Hassan 
2003) 
 
In contrast, conventional banks operate mainly on the basis of a business 
model that ‘banks like other firms are to maximize shareholders value’. The 
driving force behind value creation is normally the next quarter’s earnings. In 
conventional banking system, the rate of interest is a vital yardstick in running 
the entire banking business as it applies the business model. In its value 
maximization objective, interest (in its different forms such as cost of capital, 
net interest margin) conveys the nature and state of supply and demand and 
embodies information concerning the market, the targets of the executives and 
shareholders expectation. 
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The operations of Islamic banks are characterised by different vocabulary or 
nomenclature. In appendix 1 we provide the nomenclature of a typical Islamic 
banking product mix 
3 Bank stability  and consumer confidence 
Several causes have been responsible for bank stability in the past ranging 
from macro economic volatility both external and internal. For example Caprio 
and Kilbegel 1996 and Kaminsky (1996) reported trade imbalance while the 
real exchange volatility is another major factor in Latin America and South 
East Asia stability predicament. The East Asian bank instability identified how 
excessive dependence on short-term and foreign currency nominated debt 
shook bank stability. Rogoff (2003) 
 
According to Borio (2008) other stability factors prevalent in recent state of 
bank instability among conventional banks is characterised by a sharp 
repricing of its product mix particularly credit risk that, given the leverage built 
up in the system, led to, and was made worse by, an disappearance of liquidity 
in many markets leading to further risk taking behaviour by US banks lending 
even more to subprime mortgage market. The performance of this sub-prime 
mortgage market of the conventional bank product mix, advanced into a 
prolonged period of broad-based aggressive risk-taking in lending. The 
situation was complicated by lack of clarity of the (new - derivatives) 
instruments. Borio (2008) adds that banks experienced a crisis of confidence 
in valuations. As time passed, the original quality of assets weakened and 
became more apparent and therefore banks were affected with liquidity 
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problem and default on different classes of assets which also lowered  
consumer confidence levels considerably. 
 
Generally customers’ confidence levels for banks are due to its several 
advantages over capital markets. According to Freixas and Santomero, (2002) 
there are at least three main reasons that banks have a comparative 
advantage which also largely account for customers’ confidence levels. The 
first good reason for the existence of intermediaries suggests that banks 
screen potential borrowers on behalf of their depositors and furthermore banks 
are valuable providers of monitoring (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). The task of 
provision of liquidity (Bryant,1980) through their services including  checking 
accounts and investment services, granting of  loans, and facilitate financial 
transactions makes bank customer trust it. Another reason is that banks are 
good in creating safe assets and as such  they are the most efficient 
institutions to handle credit risk and liquidity because of the immense expertise 
they posses (Casu, at.al, 2006, p. 15-17). Finally, of late, banks have taken 
steps to securitize loans through quantitative and qualitative process and have 
the capacity to transfer their default risk which also influence customers’ 
perceptions on confidence levels. Several studies provide a theoretical basis 
for our paper. For example, Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffee (1974) regard 
banks as utility-maximizing units and use mean-variance analysis to compare 
portfolio choice with and without a capital regulation while Koehn and 
Santomero (1980) showed that the introduction of higher leverage ratios may 
shift their portfolio to riskier assets. 
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Kim and Santomero (1988) suggested the use correct processes of risk 
measurements and recommend the use of the solvency ratio. Rochet (1992) 
found the effectiveness of capital regulations depended on whether the banks 
were value-maximizing meaning capital regulations could not prevent risk-
taking actions by banks  
 
Another strand of the literature on factors of bank stability uses option models. 
For example, Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley (1990) found that higher 
capital requirements reduce the incentives for a value-maximizing bank to 
increase asset risk. The recent product mix by conventional banks saw growth 
of credit risk transfer and the development of a market for credit risk transfer 
influenced structural innovation in the financial system as it puts forward a 
wide range of instruments to deal with different aspects of credit risk 
(Scheicher, 2008) that also affected consumers in many ways. For example, 
Scheicher (2008) reports that such instruments presents default protection for 
individual firms through credit default swaps (CDS) and that such CD’s are 
packaged and traded by means of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 
which eventually became the centre of bank instability.  
 
3.1 The link between stability factors and confidence 
It is important to note that the link between liquidity, capital, risk and 
confidence has occupied the banking literature. As a result supervisory 
authorities argue that in order to protect the stability of the financial system, 
additional restraints on capital adequacy should be implemented. They argue 
that the losses suffered when a bank fails leads to the exceeding of costs 
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taken up by the investors in the banks securities is due to the nature of 
liabilities. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) points out that one of the key reasons 
why banks are fragile, is that  as they execute their function of transforming 
maturity they succumb to meet depositors’ potential liquidity needs. 
Nonetheless, almost no effort has to date been devoted to an analysis of one 
of the key ingredients that make banks safer institutions and that is their own 
holdings of liquid assets. Borio (2008) for instance asks three pertinent 
questions on factors of bank stability:  how much liquidity should banks hold as 
a buffer against bank run? Do liquidity ratios reflect capital and risk 
behaviours?. How might the size of bank liquidity shield be influenced by bank 
idiosyncratic factors?  While we might not directly answer all these question 
our discussion and conclusions would epitomize them. 
 
Generally, the requirements for a higher capital to assets ratio is assumed to 
reduce the deposit funding of a bank and is linked to risk taking strategies 
(Besanko and Kanatas, 1996). The main reason for higher capital, leading to 
liquidity may also be linked to greater risk exposure because according to 
Santomero and Watson (1977), during the last century commercial banks have 
been financed with less of capital relative to debt. So, some economists and 
regulators see this trend with uncertainty as they argued that low capital leads 
to bank failures, financial instability and consequent consumer confidence 
levels. Furthermore, regulatory authorities also argue that allowing bank 
capital to lessen is not safe or proper and that in order to protect consumer 
confidence in financial system and therefore additional restraints on capital 
adequacy should be implemented.  
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The argument that the losses suffered when a bank fails leads to the 
excessive costs taken up by the investors in situations when banks experience 
bank runs. This reason is evidenced by the current financial turmoil where 
banks issued and bought several securities in the financial market which were 
contaminated. This line of argument mainly rely on market evaluation and of 
the relative riskiness of commercial banks and holds that the debt and equity 
capital in the securities market is enough to keep the commercial banking 
system to assume undue risks. Furlong and Keeley (1989) report that the 
federal deposit insurance was an important factor towards the increase of 
capital standards in banking during the 1980’s. Furthermore, they noted that 
an increase in asset risk was obvious due to the enforcement of higher capital 
ratio requirements. The effect of a higher capital ratio on default risk is 
explained as the central issue in bank capital regulation. 
 
Dahl and Shrieves (1992) examined the differential responses of 
undercapitalised banks suggest that, for undercapitalised banks, the degree of 
undercapitalisation is a substantial influence on the probability of equity market 
issues and market conditions are less.  Berger and Udell (1994) too found 
growth rates for a number of asset mix to have positive relationship with 
capital.  
 
Financial markets have become obscure in several behaviours. For instance, 
some markets, hedge funds or credit default swaps, hardly disclose useful 
information for risk assessment. Notwithstanding its importance, disclosure 
alone does not necessarily guarantee genuine transparency. Market 
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participants need adequate, bias free and relevant information delivered in an 
appropriate, timely manner. As an illustration, recent market occurrences 
involving off-balance-sheet entities and complex financial instruments reveal 
the lack of transparency ensuing from the incorrect information disclosed late 
and in the wrong way. Information on mortgages too suffers from a similar 
predicament, leaving many borrowers fail to make a well-informed decision. 
These complex instruments surrounded by speculation may not have similar 
effect to Islamic banks compared to conventional banks.  
 
In a study on the performance of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) Samad 
and Hassan (1999) examined liquidity, and solvency risk for the period of 1984 
to 1997. The analysis showed that Islamic banks were somewhat more liquid 
as compared to other eight commercial banks operating in the same market. 
Bashir (2001) examines the relationship between banking characteristics and 
performance measures for fourteen Islamic banks for the period 1993 to 1998 
in eight Middle Eastern countries and found that sharia-compliant banks in his 
sample have more liquidity than non-sharia compliant banks.  
 
In another study, Siddiqui (2008) examined financial contracts, risk and 
performance of Islamic banks in Pakistan for the period from 2002 to 2003 and 
documented that Islamic banks have higher liquidity and larger cash balances 
compared to their conventional banks counterparts. More recently, Samad 
(2004) examined the financial performance and liquidity of Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in Bahrain for the period from 1991 to 2001 for six Islamic 
and 15 conventional banks. Results for Samad confirmed the study by Bashir 
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(2001) that there were higher ratios of liquidity in Islamic banks compared to 
those of conventional banks  
 
With respect to risk, according to Sarker (1999) Islamic banking products have 
different risk characteristics and therefore different prudential regulation should 
be erected while Khan and Bhatt (2008) reports that in order to manage risk of 
the banking sector as a whole, central banks of the Islamic countries have 
stipulated various capital adequacy and reserve requirements which are not 
uniform to all Islamic banks in various regions of the world. It should be noted 
that Islamic banks do not have a large portion of their assets in fixed income 
interest bearing assets, as compared to conventional banks. Therefore, they 
may require a larger capital adequacy ratio and a larger liquidity ratio and that 
by basing on this argument; the Basel Committee has stipulated higher 
minimum capital requirements for Islamic banks (Siddiqui, 2008) 
 
4 Methodology  
4.1 Data  
We have obtained our data from Bankscope and our sample is drawn from the 
following six countries which form the GCC: (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman and United Arab Emirates) has included two types of 
specializations: Islamic and conventional (in accordance with International 
Association of Islamic Banks membership classification). The sample comprise 
all 194 banks of which 50 are Islamic banks and 144 are conventional banks. 
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4.2 Model 
In our study we measure financial stability (BS) in banking using three 
important indicators. First is BS ROAV  which is computed as the standard 
deviation of ROA. We expect positive and significant results. Our second 
measure of stability is the BS Tobin Q. which we calculate by equity by earnings. 
In Tobin’s Q (Tobin, 1969), Q gives the summary of available and pertinent 
information about the future for bank’s investment decision. Q implies that: a 
unit increase in the firm’s capital stock, increases the present value of the 
firm’s profits by Q, and therefore raises the value of the firm by Q.( Hill 2006).  
Aspachs et. al. 2005 and Almeida et al have also used Tobin’s Q in their 
model to examine liquidity during economic constraints or crisis period and 
found significant relationship between Tobin Q and cash flow. In our study we 
expect a positive Tobin Q because a value which is greater than 1 indicates 
the bank is doing well in terms of decision investment making decisions (in our 
case sharia compliant decisions versus conventional banking decisions) which 
may lead to differences in changes in capital, liquidity and risk. We therefore 
also interpret that if Tobin Q is higher then the access profit of a bank is used 
to improve its liquidity and risk capital since in accounting it constitute some 
form of non distributable profit. So, generally, a higher Tobin Q means more 
confidence as far as depositors are concern. 
 
Our third measure of BS is captured by banks liquidity ( BSLIQ  ). Banks in 
stable situation will not face liquidity constraint because deposits will only be 
easy to mobilize but also the timing of cash flows from loans will not be 
affected by an increasing level of non performing assets. We use loan loss 
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provision over deposits to measure the impact of non performing loans to 
banks sustainability. Finally we estimate illiquidity using the ratio of current 
asset over current liability to find factors that may influence the level of liquidity 
among banks. Therefore, other two measures will be BSNPA and  BSLIQ 
respectively and then we also differentiate between Islamic banks FTisb  and 
conventional banksFTisb  respectively. Therefore in order to carry this 
analysis we will run equations 1 – 12. 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjiROAV
CC
CIRNLTALLPPBTBS
tji
..6..5
..4..3..2..1
..
ξλλ
λλλλα
+
++++= (1) 
 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjiROAV
CC
CIRNLTALLPPBTBSisb
tji
..6..5
..4..3..2..1
..
ξλλ
λλλλα
+
++++=
 
(2) 
 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjiROAV
CC
CIRNLTALLPPBTBScb
tji
..6..5
..4..3..2..1
..
ξλλ
λλλλα
++
++++=
 
(3) 
 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjiTobinQ
CC
CIRNLTALLPPBTBS
tji
..6..5
..4..3..2..1..
ξλλ
λλλλα
+
++++=
 
(4) 
 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjiTobinQ
CC
CIRNLTALLPPBTBSisb
tji
..6..5
..4..3..2..1..
ξλλ
λλλλα
+
++++=
 
(5) 
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tjitji
tjitjitjitjiTobinQ
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CIRNLTALLPPBTBScb
tji
..6..5
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tjitji
jitjitjitjitjiNPA
CC
CIRNLTALLPPBTBS
..6..5
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ξλλ
λλλλα
+
++++= (7) 
 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjitjiNPA
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CIRNLTALLPPBTBSisb
..6..5
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λλλλα
+
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(8) 
 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjitjiNPA
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..6..5
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λλλλα
+
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tjitji
tjitjitjitjiLIQ
CC
CIRNLTALLPPBTBS
tji
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ξλλ
λλλλα
+
++++=
 
(10) 
 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjiLIQ
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..6..5
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ξλλ
λλλλα
+
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(11) 
 
tjitji
tjitjitjitjiLIQ
CC
CIRNLTALLPPBTBScb
tji
..6..5
..4..3..2..1..
ξλλ
λλλλα
+
++++=
 
(12) 
The variables used and their computation is as follows: 
BSROAV tji ..  = Return on average assets for bank i, in country j on period t 
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tjiNPABS ..  = 
Non performing assets proxied by loan loss provision over total assets 
tjiLIQ
BS
..
 = Liquidity measured by liquid assets over total assets 
BS Tobin Q = Equity over earnings for each bank in country j and year t 
tjiPBT ..  = Profit before tax for bank i in each country for each year 
LLPi.j.t = Loan loss provision over total loans 
ETA tji ..  =  Equity to assets ratio, bank i country j 
NLTA tji ..  =  Net loans to Total assets, bank i country j 
CIR i.j.t = Cost income ratio, bank i country j 
CC i.j.t = Consumer confidence proxied by the ratio of deposits over total assets for 
bank i in country j 
tji ..ξ  
= The error term for each bank in each GCC country for each year 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of Statistics 
a) Summary Statistics – All banks (Islamic and conventional) 
 GCC countries from 2000 - 2007 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PBT 194 60.8 91.8 -10.3 494.0 
LLP 194 5.7 11.8 12.7 56.6 
ROA 174 48.9 26.3 0.0 100.0 
CIR 194 45.6 27.3 0.1 178.2 
NLTA 137 28.5 76.7 0.0 665.8 
LIQ 194 7.6 8.4 -7.2 53.2 
Tobin Q 109 0.003 0.008 -0.016 0.071 
NPA 194 40.47 27.50 6.98 100.00 
CC 176 0.52 0.28 0.00 0.89 
b) Summary statistics for Islamic banks only of the GCC  
between 2000 and 2007 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PBT 144 138.3 335.8 -26.7 563.0 
LLP 133 25.8 58.0 12.7 239.1 
NLTA 144 52.6 27.1 0.0 100.0 
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c) Summary statistics conventional banks of the GCC between 2000 and 2007 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PBT 50 64.0 113.91 -99.9 494 
LLP 31 4.39 10.89 -1.5 56.6 
NLTA 41 45.41 24.86 4.51 96.06 
CIR 50 34.07 23.19 1 77.38 
LIQ 50 41.28 79.75 0.09 419.05 
ROAV 35 6.63 7.94 -4.97 30.18 
NPA 27 0.61 2.32 -7 7.86 
Tobin Q 11 52.77 83.84 1.53 267.70 
CC 50 0.61 0.256 0 0.88 
 
The summary statistics (table 1) show that the mean PBT for the GCC all 
banks sample is 60.8 which is close to the 64 for Conventional banks while the 
mean PBT for Islamic banks records at 138.3. This difference is attributed to 
two main factors. First, to some extent to the nature of accounting treatment of 
PBT in profit –loss sharing arrangement may be counted as a financial cost, 
and second but to a great extent Islamic banks earn high PBT due to its 
prices. We chose to use PBT because we cannot use Net interest margin 
(NIM) to compare these two types of banks because Islamic banks do not 
charge nor earn interest. 
Another variable we have examined is the Loan Loss provision. Most reported 
values have been very small and rounded to 0.  As for the GCC banking it has 
a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 5 while the highest is 20.64. This 
variation is evident by nature of accounting for NPA with respect to Islamic 
banks since they account loan loss under profit loss because the nature of 
CIR 144 48.4 27.1 9.6 178.2 
LIQ 143 20.5 71.1 0.02 665.8 
ROAV 102 7.7 8.3 -7.2 53.2 
NPA 82 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tobin Q 144 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.0 
CC 144     
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Islamic banking is Profit-Loss Sharing Contract. On the other hand, the 
variable ROA ranges from – 7 representing loss making banks to 53% while 
the mean is 8%. There is interesting variation in the variable CIR with the 
mean of 44% but when we compare the CIR for the two bank specialization we 
note remarkable difference. While Conventional banks post a 48 percent CIR 
the Islamic banks are lower at 34 percent. The NLTA for all the banks has a 
mean of 50 percent and a standard deviation of 26%.  
 
5 Results and discussion  
This section outlines the results of the regression. Our first measure of  BS 
which is tjiROAV
BS
..   and differentiated among two bank specializations or 
product mix  are 
tjiROAV
BSisb
..
 and  tjiROAV
BScb
..  for Islamic and conventional 
banks respectively. Table 2 give comparative results of the three regressions 
which shows how the two types of banks are impacted by changes in financial 
conditions. ROAVi.j.t is positive and significantly related to PBT for all banks but 
exhibit different relationship when examined separately. It has positive but 
insignificant relationship with PBT while is negatively and insignificantly related 
to  PBT in Conventional banks. 
<Insert Table 2> 
We also use Tobin Q to measure the effect of instability and to assess if it 
impacts differently for Islamic and conventional banks. As shown in table 2  the 
three equations: 
tjiTobinQ
BS
..
,
tjiTobinQ
BSisb
..
 and 
tjiTobinQ
BScb
..
 show 
interesting results. Tobin Q is inversely but significantly related to bank specific 
factors of PBT, LLP, NLTA for all banks. However, Conventional banks posit 
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positive relationship for PBT. Our measure for consumer confidence is 
tjiCC ..5λ  is the depositors’ discipline which customers exercise when then they 
loose confidence.  
Although Islamic banks are more capitalized than conventional banks, 
conventional banks have higher averages of liquidity compared to Islamic 
banks; we have found that liquidity in GCC banks generally tend not to be 
determined by bank specific factors. This implies that factors external to the 
bank such as macro economic and market behaviour have significant 
relationship with bank liquidity. Such macro economic factors that prevailed, 
for example in the US and European markets were contributory to the 
recession. 
 
Furthermore, Islamic banks reported very small Non performing assets (NPA) 
and have shown positive and significant relationship with liquidity implying that 
subprime loans as in the case in US and UK may have substantial effect on 
bank liquidity. Moreover, the regression for all banks in the sample too,  exhibit 
positive and significant relationship with LLP but show insignificant relationship 
when separated. 
 
We also found that in GCC conventional banks have higher liquidity levels 
than their counterparts suggesting that unlike in the findings of Samad and 
Hassan (1999) in GCC conventional banks tend to carry more liquidity, most 
likely to maintain confidence levels for their consumers. Generally, compared 
to US or EU banks, GCC banks carried higher liquidity levels due to its 
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economy during the period examined having accumulated funds from oil 
surpluses.  
Other studies (Kaleem, 2000; Kia, 2001; and Darrat, 2002) detailed 
several advantages of the Islamic banking system citing Iran with its long 
experience since 1984. The stability contributed by Islamic banking may 
not be influenced by policy and other exogenous shocks. Kia and Darrat 
(2003) compare the Islamic bank product mix and concludes that it 
provides a  most stable and  invariant policy function, while Kaleem (2000) 
too  supports on the stability of the Islamic monetary instruments in a dual 
banking system in Malaysia as less vulnerable to crises 
 
Our last measure for consumer confidence levels proxied by deposit and 
customer funding over total liabilities indicates higher confidence levels for 
Islamic banks in this region which operates both banks in parallel. 
 
Recent review by the American Congress (2009) reveal that the regulatory 
system not only failed to manage risk but also failed to call for adequate 
disclosure of risk through satisfactory level of transparency. As a result,  
American Congress (2009) identified eight specific areas most urgently in 
need of reform on financial system to address to current bank stability 
situation: These  are to (1) identify and regulate financial institutions that pose 
systemic risk; (2) limit excessive leverage financial institution; (3) increase 
supervision of the shadow financial system; (4) create a new system to 
regulate product mix particularly mortgages and other consumer credit 
products; (5) create executive pay structures that discourage excessive risk 
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taking; (6) reform the credit rating system; and (7) establishing a global 
financial regulatory floor. 
 
Four of these (AC, 2009) recommendations reflect distinct departure in 
regulatory practices in the nature of bank product mix such as areas of 
leverage, contracts, instruments, and mortgages for both Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. 
 
Blum (1999) discussed the possibility of increase of bank riskiness due to 
capital adequacy rules by analysing a single bank with the result of optimal 
choices being compared with the first best solution of the model and found that 
an additional unit of equity leads to an additional unit of investment which is 
larger than a unit in the risky asset. This leverage effect makes equity more 
valuable to a regulated bank. Gehrig (1995) discuses excessive risk taking 
takes through direct investments in risky assets wherein these assets may be 
high risk projects or might be risky securities and is difficult to monitor 
substituted safe assets over risky assets by outside investors or depositors. 
Policy implication is that Islamic banks product mix provides alternative 
practices in risk sharing and capital worth considering their adoption.   
 
Areas for future research in this area concerns the nature in which banks are 
exposed to the sub prime exposure as urgued by  Woertz (2008) for example 
in  that banks in GCC  may have direct exposure incurred by sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs), such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and the Kuwait 
Investment Authority (KIA)  amidst maturity mismatches especially in real 
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estate financing  and the probability that GCC bank customers had invested in 
CDO’s issued in the US. 
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Table2 : Results of the regressions  
 
Results of the ROAV fixed effect regression 
       
 All banks  Islamic  Non-Islamic 
       
PBT 0.049738*** 0.007  -0.017  
 (0.013)  (0.006)  0.009  
LLP -0.088  0.037  -0.271***  
 (0.143)  (0.051)  0.024  
NLTA 0.050  0.080  0.027  
 (0.077)  (0.093)  0.029  
CIR -0.057  -0.086  -0.079***  
 (0.031)  (0.037)  0.020  
_cons 1.222  1.994  5.677***  
 (4.020)  (5.180)  1.219  
       
  
 
Results of the Tobin Q  fixed effect regression 
       
 All banks  Islamic  Non-Islamic 
       
PBT -0.01 0.002  0.020  
 (0.02)  (0.008)  (0.084)  
LLP -0.07  -0.024  -0.055  
 (0.11)  (0.075)  (0.147)  
NLTA -0.04  -0.012  -0.094  
 (0.11)  (0.120)  (0.227)  
CIR 0.02  0.038  -0.265  
 (0.05)  (0.054)  (0.132)  
_cons 26.34***  24.667  31.962  
 (6.29)  (7.394)  (9.246)  
       
  
 
Results of the NPA -  fixed effect regression 
       
 All banks  Islamic  Non-Islamic 
       
PBT 4E-06*** 2E-06***  -0.075***  
 (2E-05)  (3E-06)  (0.027)  
LLP 5E-04***  1E-04***  0.018  
 (9E-05)  (3E-05)  (0.081)  
NLTA 3E-07***  -4E-05***  -0.051  
 (1E-04)  (5E-05)  (0.073)  
CIR 3E-05***  5E-06***  0.025  
 (4E-05)  (2E-05)  (0.042)  
_cons -1E-03***   2E-03***  3.722  
 (5E-03)   (3E-03)  (3.089)  
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Results of the ROAV fixed effect regression 
       
 All banks  Islamic  Non-Islamic 
       
PBT 0.049738*** 0.007  -0.017  
 (0.013)  (0.006)  0.009  
LLP -0.088  0.037  -0.271***  
 (0.143)  (0.051)  0.024  
NLTA 0.050  0.080  0.027  
 (0.077)  (0.093)  0.029  
CIR -0.057  -0.086  -0.079***  
 (0.031)  (0.037)  0.020  
_cons 1.222  1.994  5.677***  
 (4.020)  (5.180)  1.219  
       
  
 
Results of the LIQ-  fixed effect regression 
      
 All banks  Islamic  Non-Islamic 
      
PBT -0.04658 -0.002183  -0.14286 
 (0.028223)  (0.006614)  (0.28501) 
LLP 0.141319  0.014719  0.196832 
 (0.143242)  (0.059842)  (0.499863) 
NLTA -0.36215***  0.344331  0.30752 
 (0.146927)  0.097095  (0.772327) 
CIR -0.07382  (0.085085)  0.405731 
 (0.082716)  (0.054346)  (0.446947) 
_cons 35.21088  34.65794  17.16252 
 (8.242715)  (6.245046)  (31.40039) 
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Table 1: Summary of Statistics 
a) Summary Statistics – All banks (Islamic and non Islamic) GCC countries from 
2000 - 2007 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PBT 194 60.8 91.8 -10.3 494.0 
LLP 194 5.7 11.8 12.7 56.6 
ROA 174 48.9 26.3 0.0 100.0 
CIR 194 45.6 27.3 0.1 178.2 
NLTA 137 28.5 76.7 0.0 665.8 
LIQ 194 7.6 8.4 -7.2 53.2 
Tobin Q 109 0.003 0.008 -0.016 0.071 
NPA 194 40.47 27.50 6.98 100.00 
CC 194     
c) Summary statistics  for Non Islamic (conventional banks) of the GCC between 
2000 and 2007 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PBT 50 64.0 113.9 -99.9 494.0 
LLP 50 4.4 10.9 -1.5 56.6 
NLTA 50 45.4 24.9 4.5 96.1 
CIR 50 34.1 23.2 0.0 77.4 
LIQ 50 41.3 79.8 0.1 419.1 
ROAV 35 6.6 7.9 -5.0 30.2 
NPA 27 0.6 2.3 -7.0 7.9 
Tobin Q 50 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.9 
CC 50     
 
b) Summary statistics for Islamic banks only of the GCC between 2000 and 2007 
      
Variable         Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PBT 144 138.3 335.8 -26.7 563.0 
LLP 133 25.8 58.0 12.7 239.1 
NLTA 144 52.6 27.1 0.0 100.0 
CIR 144 48.4 27.1 9.6 178.2 
LIQ 143 20.5 71.1 0.02 665.8 
ROAV 102 7.7 8.3 -7.2 53.2 
NPA 82 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tobin Q 144 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.0 
CC 144     
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